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COMMENTS
UP IN SMOKE?: THE LAST IN TIME RULE
AND EMPRESA CUBANA DEL TABACO V.
CULBRO CORP.
MICHAEL A. NAMIKAs*
INTRODUCTION
"Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation;
and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand."1
Perched high above state law are the supreme laws of the
United States.2 Divided into three bodies, these laws control and
* J.D., St. John's University School of Law, 2007; B.A., Pace University, 2004. The au-
thor would like to thank Professor Christopher Borgen for his guidance and knowledge of
International Law issues, his family and Lisa for supporting him, and Ashley for smiling
all of the time.
' Matthew 12:25.
Abraham Lincoln, in his speech accepting the Republican nomination for President in
1858, famously paraphrased this quote. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Review: The Civil
War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 691, 719 (2004).
2 The Supremacy Clause mandates that the Constitution, federal law, and treaties of
the United States are superior to the laws and constitutions of the individual states. See
generally Ernest R. Larkins, U.S. Income Tax Treaties in Research and Planning: A
Primer, 18 VA. TAX REV. 133, 133 (1998). "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
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foster the destiny of the great "democratic experiment," born in
1776.3 Although these bodies are separate and distinct from each
other, they are not islands unto themselves: they have often
clashed in battles fought in the courts of our nation. 4 Although
the Constitution has reigned unchallenged as the undisputed
champion of United States law,5 bouts between treaties and fed-
eral law have ended uncertainly.
International treaties and the laws of the United States are
both supreme under Article VI, Clause II of the United States
Constitution and consequently cannot be modified or repealed by
state law. 6 The Constitution's silence on the hierarchy of su-
preme laws has led to conflicts among these bodies of law and the
Supreme Court has been charged with determining the victor.7 In
a series of momentous decisions in the late nineteenth century,
the Court called it a draw.8 In fashioning the Last in Time rule
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
3 Ken Gormley, Perspectives: Federal Jurisprudence, State Autonomy: The Silver Anni-
versary of New Judicial Federalism, 66 ALB. L. REV. 797, 807 (2003); see H. Wayne House,
A Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There be Peaceful Coexistence of Religion with the Secular
State?, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 203, 233 (1999) (noting that United States began in 1776).
4 See e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (discussing
separation of powers issue between executive and legislative branches when President
Truman attempted to commandeer steel mills during wartime); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126
S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (rejecting Presidential attempts to establish military commissions to
try terrorists, holding that only Congress can independently setup military commissions
because the president alone has no authority to do so).
5 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115(3) (1987) (stating that
rules of international law and provisions of international agreements will not be given
effect if they are inconsistent with the United States Constitution), see generally Louis
Henkin, May The President Violate Customary International Law?: The President and In-
ternational Law, 80 A.J.I.L. 930 (1986) (discussing this conflict of laws issue).
6 See Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the
Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1726, 1729 (1998) (noting that Framers "made clear that
treaties would be supreme to state law"); Louis Henkin, Essays Commemorating the One
Hundredth Anniversary of the Harvard Law Review: The Constitution and United States
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 871-
72 (1987) (describing treaties as the "law of the land," and supreme to state law).
I See The Chinese Exclusion Case. Chae Chan Ping. v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600
(1889) (discussing how a court will decide which conflicting law to follow); Louis Henkin,
Colloquy: Lexical Priority or "Political Question" A Response, 101 HARV. L. REV. 524, 531
("[Tlhe framers of the Constitution did not address the lexical hierarchy of statutes and
treaties ... in the [Supremacy Clause] or elsewhere.").
8 See Henkin, supra note 7, at 524 ("[Tjhe Court may be saying only that when a statute
is inconsistent with an earlier treaty, the treaty remains law in the United States and is
'lexically superior' to the statute, but that the courts cannot give effect to the treaty be-
cause a decision by the government to violate international law raises a political, and
LASTIN TIME RULE
for conflicts between international treaties and federal law, the
Court reasoned that the two bodies of law are equal 9 and the
most recent expression of the sovereign will should govern. 10 Un-
der this rule, the treaty or federal law that is "last in time" will
prevail over the other.11
Rarely questioned by the courts themselves, the Last in Time
rule has become outdated precedent in a global society increas-
ingly reliant on multilateral treaties. 12 It was questionably set
forth in decisions that used flawed reasoning and assumptions.
The implications of such a rule upon international law and policy
are substantial. It violates international law and encourages the
United States to ignore its commitments, harming its reputation
and isolating it from the rest of the world. 13 Moreover, the rule is
arguably not in the spirit of the Framers' original intent and con-
tradicts the writings of the Supreme Court's first Chief Justice,
therefore nonjusticiable, question."); Peter Westen, The Place of Foreign Treaties in the
Courts of the United States: A Reply to Louis Henkin, 101 HARV. L. REV. 511, 519 (1987)
(discussing the nonjusticiability of political questions).
9 See Chinese Exclusion, 130 U.S. at 600 (finding treaties and acts of Congress supreme
and that "no paramount authority is given to one over the other.").
10 See id. (announcing that "the last expression of the sovereign will must control"); see
also Westen, supra note 8, at 513 ("[Tlhe Court in Chinese Exclusion chose to resolve con-
flicts between treaties and subsequent statutes by always giving effect to the latter").
11 The RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW describes the Last in Time rule:
An act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an
international agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to su-
persede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provi-
sion cannot be fairly reconciled.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L. § 115(1)(a) (1987). The flipside of the Last in
Time coin is described in § 115 (2): "A provision of a treaty of the United States that be-
comes effective as law of the United States supersedes as domestic law any inconsistent
preexisting provision of a law or treaty of the United States." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN REL. L. § 115(2) (1987).
12 See New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662, 736-37 (1836) ("The government of
the United States ... is one of limited powers... Congress cannot ... enlarge the federal
jurisdiction, nor can it be enlarged under the treaty-making power .... the treaty cannot
give this power to the federal government"); see also Willis L. M. Reese, Full Faith and
Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 IOWA L. REV. 183, 193 (1957) (discussing the
states'conflicts of laws with international laws).
13 See generally Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional
Power and International Law: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of
Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393, 393 (1988) (discussing the exceptions to the "last in time"
rule and international law); but see Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-
in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319 (2005) (defending the
"last in time" rule).
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John Jay, and our nation's greatest economist, Alexander Hamil-
ton. 14
Recently in Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp.,15 the
United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the Last
in Time rule to justify its emphasis on the Cuban embargo in
finding that Cubatabaco did not have a right to the Cohiba cigar
trademark in the United States. 16 Cubatabaco's claim under the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property was
found in conflict with subsequent embargo regulations and was
dismissed.17
This comment uses the Second Circuit's decision to criticize the
Last in Time rule's application by arguing that a unified ap-
proach, granting more deference to multilateral treaties, should
be applied.' 8 Part I of this comment is a discussion of the rela-
tionship between international treaties and federal law, focusing
primarily on the Last in Time rule and the decisions that deline-
ated it. Part II is an overview of the facts leading to the Cohiba
trademark controversy and the Second Circuit's focus on the em-
bargo and Last in Time rule in its decision. Part III argues that
Last in Time should not apply to multilateral treaties because it
14 James Madison stated:
Does it follow, because this [treaty-making] power is given to Congress, that it is
absolute and unlimited? I do not conceive that power is given to the President
and Senate to dismember the empire, or to alienate any great, essential right. I
do not think the whole legislative authority have this power. The exercise of the
power must be consistent with the object of the delegation.
Paust, supra note 13, at 394 n.1 (quoting DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 514 (J.
Elliot ed. 1937)).
15 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2005).
16 Id. at 481 (discussing Last in Time rule application to Cubatabaco's Paris Convention
claim).
17 Id. (holding Embargo Regulations to bar Cubatabaco's acquisition of property rights
inside the United States "to the extent that the Paris Convention, standing alone, might
pose an irreconcilable conflict to the Regulations, the latter will prevail.").
18 This comment does not discuss the relationship between customary international law
and domestic law. Legal scholars have argued that as multilateral treaties have increased
in importance over the past half-century, the significance of international custom has di-
minished. See generally Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment, Revival of Customary Hu-
manitarian Law, 99 A.J.I.L. 817, 817 (2005), which further discusses this viewpoint. It
has also been argued that customary international law has transformed over time into
something that "no longer deserves recognition as international law." Samuel Estreicher,
The New York University- University of Virginia Conference on Exploring the Limits of In-
ternational Law: Rethinking the Binding Effect of Customary International Law, 44 VA. J.
INT'L L. 5, 14-15 (2003). Since Cubatabaco's claims in Empresa were brought under multi-
lateral treaties, that is this comment's focus.
LAST!N TIME RULE
is an unwise rule based upon questionable and incomplete rea-
soning, which both violates international law and is capable of
unnecessarily harming the reputation of the United States.
I. THE LAST IN TIME RULE
A. Monism and Dualism
The terms monism and dualism refer to two different theories
concerning the relationship that exists between international and
domestic law. 19 Although the terms have been criticized as sim-
ple,20 they are still frequently used in discussions of international
law issues.
The modern monist theory was pioneered in the first half of the
twentieth century by Hans Kelsen,21 and is one that combines in-
ternational law and domestic law into a single body. 22 Under a
monist system, a state's international laws and policies inevita-
bly affect its domestic laws and policies. 23 For example, in a mo-
nist nation, an international treaty need not be separately rati-
19 See Henkin, Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, supra note 6, at 864 (rec-
ognizing international law jurisprudence as a "division between schools commonly identi-
fied as 'monist' and dualist."'); Rett R. Ludwikowski, Supreme Law or Basic Law? The De-
cline of the Concept of Constitutional Supremacy, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 253, 254
(2001) (noting "the classical dispute between monistic and dualistic schools.").
20 See Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 185, 201 (1993) ("Monism and dualism simply delineate general positions
on the relative hierarchy of international versus municipal laws."); see Henkin, Century of
Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, supra note 6, at 864-866 (discussing the differences
between monism and dualism).
21 See Jacob Dolinger, Brazilian Supreme Court Solutions for Conflicts Between Domes-
tic and International Law: An Exercise in Eclecticism, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 1041, 1044-45
(1993) ('The monist school started with Hans Kelsen"); see also Ludwikowski, supra note
19, at 262 (noting monism "was strongly supported by Hans Kelsen of the Vienna School
of jurisprudence").
22 See Matthew Brottman, The Clash Between the WTO and the ESA: Drowning a Tur-
tle to Eat a Shrimp, 16 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 337 (1999) (noting monism "views the
relationship between domestic law and international law as one of fusion"); see also Hen-
kin, Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, supra note 6, at 864 (noting monists
view "international and domestic law as together constituting a single legal system").
23 See Henkin, Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, supra note 6, at 864 (not-
ing monist states must respect international law when enacting legislation); see also
Rachael E. Schwartz, Chaos, Oppression, and Rebellion: The Use of Self-Help to Secure
Individual Rights Under International Law, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J. 255, 305 (1994) (finding
that dualist states incorporate both international and domestic law).
2008]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 22:3
fled in order for it to be binding domestically.2 4 Since there is only
one system of law, any further endorsement of the treaty would
be superfluous. In addition to being implemented without do-
mestic legislation, international law is supreme in a monist na-
tion and cannot be overruled by ordinary domestic law.25
These basic principles of monist theory are reflected in the law
and policy of monist nations. France is one of the most promi-
nent monist nations.26 Article fifty-five of the French Constitu-
tion mandates that published treaties prevail over prior or sub-
sequent acts of Parliament.27 The Netherlands is also a monist
country. 28 Article ninety-four of the Dutch Constitution holds
that statutes in force within the Kingdom will not be applied if
they conflict with treaty provisions. 29 Across the Atlantic Ocean
from Europe, Mexico's system can fairly be characterized as mo-
24 See Henkin, Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, supra note 6, at 864 (stat-
ing "[diomestic courts must give effect to international law" in a monist state); see also
Elizabeth Manera Edelstein, The Loi Toubon: Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite, but Only on
France's Terms, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1127, 1164 (2003) ("France is a monist state: ...
the terms of international conventions are incorporated directly into national laws").
25 See Antonio La Pergola and Patrick Del Duca, New International Law in National
Systems: Community Law, International Law and the Italian Constitution, 79 A.J.I.L.
598, 601 (1985) (noting that "by adopting international law, the national legal system
subordinates itself to a superior legal order."); see also Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of
International Law as a Canon ofDomestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103,
1134 (1990) (stating strict monism "conceives international law as normatively superior to
domestic law.").
26 See Edward T. Canuel, Nationalism, Self-Determination, and Nationalist Movements:
Exploring the Palestinian and Quebec Drives for Independence, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 85, 93 (1997) (identifying France as monist); see also Edelstein, supra note 24, at
1164 (describing France's system as monistic).
27 Article fifty-five of the French Constitution exhibits France's monist view of the rela-
tionship between international law and domestic law. Article fifty-five states that
"[tireaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall, upon publication, prevail over
Acts of Parliament, subject, in regard to each agreement or treaty, to its application by
the other party." See Pierre Michel Eisemann & Raphaele Rivier, National Treaty Law
and Practice: France, NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 268, 277 (Duncan B. Hollis et
al. eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005).
28 See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis,
86 A.J.I.L. 310, 320 (1992) (characterizing Netherlands' Constitution as monist); see also
Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 126 n. 148 (2004) (stating Netherlands has a monist legal system).
- The superiority of treaty law has never been seriously questioned in the legal litera-
ture of the Netherlands. Article ninety-four of the Dutch Constitution states: "Statutory
regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such application is in
conflict with provisions of treaties that are binding on all persons or of resolutions by in-
ternational institutions." See J.G. Brouwer, National Treaty Law and Practice: The Neth-
erlands, NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 27, at 498, 508.
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nist.30 Mexico's hierarchy of law places the Constitution above
federal laws and treaties. 31 Although Mexican courts have been
wary of declaring the superiority of international law over ordi-
nary domestic legislation, 32 they recently did so in a 1999 case
involving a conflict between federal law and a treaty.33
There are two legal systems within a dualist state: domestic
law and international law. 34 Unlike monism, dualism rejects in-
tegration of international law into the domestic legal system.35 A
dualist nation has two bodies of law; actions involving one do not
necessarily bind the other. 36 The autonomy of nations in the in-
30 See Patrick Del Duca, The Rule of Law: Mexico's Approach to Expropriation Disputes
in the Face of Investment Globalization, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 35, 122 (2003) (noting Mexico's
monist approach); see also Jorge Cicero, International Law in Mexican Courts, 30 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1035, 1046 (1997) (declaring that Mexico follows monist system).
31 See Dr. Luis Miguel Diaz, National Treaty Law and Practice: Mexico, NATIONAL
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 27, at 452 (noting Mexico's Constitution "shall
prevail over treaties"); see also Patrick Del Duca, supra note 30, at 111 (citing "Mexican
constitution supremacy").
32 In 1992, Mexico's Supreme Court ruled that federal laws and treaties are equal in
rank. Three years later, it decided that it was not competent to decide between Mexican
federal law and the Paris Convention on Patent Law. See Diaz, National Treaty Law and
Practice: Mexico, NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 27, at 452; see also Del
Duca, supra note 30, at 122. The author noted that the 1999 Supreme Court decision held
that international law is above domestic law.
33 The Mexican Supreme Court reevaluated its interpretation of Article 133 of Mexico's
Constitution and placed international treaties "above federal laws, second in rank to the
Constitution." See Diaz, National Treaty Law and Practice: Mexico, NATIONAL TREATY
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 27, at 452-53. According to Article 133 of the Mexican
Constitution:
This Constitution, the laws of the Congress of the Union that come from it, and
all the treaties that are in accord with it that have been concluded and that are
to be concluded by the President of the Republic with the approval of the Sen-
ate will be the Supreme Law of all the Union. The judges of every State will fol-
low this Constitution and these laws and treaties in considering dispositions to
the contrary that are contained in the constitutions or the laws of the States.
Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended, Art. 133,
Diario Oficial de la Federacion [D.O.]. 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.).
34 See Henkin, Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, supra note 6, at 864 (as-
serting that "dualists view international law as a discrete legal system."); see also Kazim-
ierz Grzybowski, Soviet Theory of International Law for the Seventies, 77 A.J.I.L. 862, 871
(1983) (noting that dualistic theory contains "two systems").
35 See Grainne De Burca & Oliver Gerstenberg, Symposium, Comparative Visions of
Global Public Order: The Denationalization of Constitutional Law, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J.
243, 249 (2006) (arguing that dualism rejects "international law penetrating the shield of
statehood and becoming 'societal' and normative."); see also Peter Krug, Internalizing
European Court of Human Rights Interpretations: Russia's Courts of General Jurisdiction
and New Directions in Civil Defamation Law, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 13 n.46 (2006) (stat-
ing that "international norms lack legal effect within the domestic legal order").
36 See Roy E. Brownell II, Comment, The Unnecessary Demise of the Line Item Veto Act:
The Clinton Administration's Costly Failure to Seek Acknowledgement of "National Secu-
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ternational community is furthered by a dualist system because
international courts cannot be the sole judges of domestic legisla-
tion. 37 The laws are interpreted by a nation's own system of
courts, ensuring that its individual sense of morality and legality
will not be left out of the law making process. 38 Unlike in most
monist states, international law is not generally viewed as supe-
rior in a dualist nation, and conflicts may be resolved in favor of
domestic law.39
As a dualist nation, the United States has separate interna-
tional and domestic legal spheres. 40 While it remains bound in in-
ternational courts of law,41 it is not necessarily bound domesti-
rity Rescission," 47 AM. U.L. REV. 1273, 1314-15 (1998) (stating "domestic and interna-
tional law each operate independently within their discrete spheres" in a dualist system);
see also Lea Brilmayer, Symposium, International Law in American Courts: A Modest
Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2294 (1991) ("The dualist position is consistent with the
horizontal tradition in international law, for the separation of the two bodies of law stems
from a traditional assumption that international law is law between states, involving dis-
tinctive entities and distinctive authoritative sources.").
37 See De Burca, supra note 35, at 247 (noting dualism's justification as "barring a do-
mestic constitutional order from placing itself, in its entirety, in the hands of an interna-
tional court"); see also Curtis Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and The Interna-
tionalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 563 (1999) (stating that "treaties must be
implemented in accordance with domestic procedural rules").
38 See De Burca, supra note 35, at 247 (arguing that dualist systems ensure that "do-
mestic order and its adjudicative acquis are subject only to their own interpretations of
basic moral norms that have been established as legal norms."); see also Henkin, Century
of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, supra note 6, at 864 (stating "each state determines
for itself by what means and in what forms" it will carry out its international obligations
in a dualist system).
39 See Maurice Copithorne, National Treaty Law and Practice: Canada, NATIONAL
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 27, at 100 (stating "Canadian courts have shown
no hesitation in enforcing Canadian law whether it be statute or common law, even if to
do so would be inconsistent with a treaty that is binding upon this country'); see also Sir
Ian Sinclair et al., National Treaty Law and Practice: United Kingdom, NATIONAL TREATY
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 27, at 742 (noting that "[w]hen giving effect to a treaty,
the treaty provisions themselves are not necessarily given the force of law in the United
Kingdom").
40 See Canuel, supra note 26, at 93 (identifying the United States as dualist); see also
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Agora: Breard: The Abiding Relevance of Federal-
ism to U.S. Foreign Relations, 92 A.J.I.L. 675, 679 (1998) (acknowledging America's dual-
ist Constitution).
41 See Steinhardt, supra note 25, at 1128 ("It is an established principle in both United
States and international jurisprudence that domestic statutes, even domestic constitu-
tional provisions, cannot be a defense to a violation of international law."); see also Fred L.
Morrison, Characteristics of International Administration in Crisis Areas: A View from the
United States of America, 54 AM J. COMP. L. 443, 448 (2006) ("International law has bind-
ing force as an obligation of the State").
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cally by international law or treaties. 42 For example, if the
United States was a signatory to a multilateral treaty forbidding
it from developing new types of nuclear weapons, Congress would
not be precluded from passing legislation providing for such de-
velopment.43 Although the United States would not be bound in-
ternally by the multilateral treaty in such a scenario, it could be
sued for a breach of that treaty by other nations in an interna-
tional court and would be liable for damages incurred as a re-
sult.44 Moreover, United States courts have found prior multilat-
eral treaties inoperative in the face of subsequent irreconcilable
Congressional legislation. 45 The courts have reached such results
by applying a rule of priority called the Last in Time rule.46
B. Milestone Last in Time Decisions
Known by its Latin name, lex posterior derogat priori,47 the
Last in Time rule has been applied to conflicts between treaties
42 Subsequent acts of Congress supersede prior international law or agreements if the
act was clearly intended to supersede the prior international law or agreement.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L. § 115(1)(a) (1987). "[International law] may not
have an immediate impact in cases before domestic courts." See Morrison, supra note 41,
at 448.
43 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L. § 115(1)(a) (1987), which exemplifies
the application of Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 1 15(1)(a). See Morrison,
supra note 41, at 450. The author discusses possible Congressional acts that could trump
international law.
44 See, e.g., Taylor et al. v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784, 785 (1855) (stating the right of the
foreign nation to "expect and require its stipulations to be kept with scrupulous good
faith; but through what internal arrangements this shall be done, is, exclusively, for the
consideration of the United States."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L.
§ 115 (1987) ("That a rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement
is superseded as domestic law does not relieve the United States of its international obli-
gation or of the consequences of a violation of that obligation").
45 See, e.g., Taylor, 23 F. Cas. at 785 (finding that there is "nothing in the mere fact that
a treaty is a law, which would prevent congress from repealing it."); see also Edye v.
Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (opining that a treaty made by the United States
with a foreign nation is subject to the acts of Congress).
46 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining the Last-in-Time rule as the
"principle that a later statute negates the effect of a prior one if the later statute expressly
repeals, or is obviously repugnant to, the earlier law"); see also Jesse Hallee, Note, The
Sheinbein Legacy: Israel's Refusal to Grant Extradition as a Model of Complexity, 15 AM.
U. INT'L L. REV. 667, 683 n.75 (2000) (stating the definition and the court's application of
the Last-in-Time rule).
47 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining "lex posterior derogat priori" as
"a later law prevails over an earlier one"); see also Hallee, supra note 46 (referring to the
Last-in-Time rule); Claire R. Kelly, Power, Linkage and Accommodation: The WTO as an
International Actor and Its Influence on Other Actors and Regimes, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 79, 98 n.130 (2006) (citing the Last-in-Time rule).
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and United States domestic law for over one hundred and fifty
years. 48 The Last in Time rule was developed by the Supreme
Court in the context of conflicts between treaties and federal law
in a series of cases from the late 19th century. One early use of
the Last in Time rule was in Edye v. Robertson, the "Head Money
Cases" decision. 49 The controversy in that case was between a
subsequent act of Congress, which imposed a customs duty on
ships bringing immigrants into the United States, 50 and a treaty
with Russia.51 Although the Supreme Court held that the Con-
gressional legislation involved did not violate "any of these trea-
ties, on any just construction of them," 52 the Court went beyond
what was necessary for its decision by fashioning what would be-
come the Last in Time rule.53 The Court opined, "so far as the
provisions in that act may be found to be in conflict with any
treaty with a foreign nation, they must prevail."54 Moreover, the
Constitution gave treaties no superiority over acts of Congress. 55
The Court then reasoned that since treaties and acts of Congress
are equal under the Constitution, a treaty is "subject to such acts
as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or re-
peal."56
48 See Taylor, 23 F. Cas. at 784-85, 788 (using the Last in Time rule for the first time in
a US court against international treaties by upholding a federal statute imposing duties
on the importation of hemp in contravention of a prior treaty between the United States
and Russia); see also Julian G. Ku, supra note 13, at 335 (stating that the "first judicial
articulation of the Last-in-Time rule occurred in Taylor v. Morton").
49 112 U.S. at 599 (being of the opinion that a treaty with a foreign nation is subject to
acts of Congress passed for enforcement, modification or repeal).
50 Id. at 589-90 (detailing the act of Congress at issue).
51 Id. at 597 (characterizing issue as "a supposed conflict between an act of Congress
imposing a customs duty, and a treaty with Russia on that subject, in force when the act
was passed").
52 Id. (holding that the Congressional legislation at issue did not violate any interna-
tional treaties).
13 Id. (finding that a treaty is subject to acts of Congress).
5 Edye, 112 U.S. at 597 (stating that if a conflict between act and treaty is found, then
the act will prevail).
55 Id. at 598-599. The Court found treaties similar to acts of Congress in that neither
are "irrepealable or unchangeable" under the Constitution. The Court also referred di-
rectly to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution in finding that treaties
and federal law are to be treated equally and whichever is more recent is to control the
other. For the full text of Article VI of the United States Constitution, see supra note 2.
56 Id. at 599 (holding that treaties subject to judicial scrutiny in United States courts
are also subject to enforcement, modification, or repeal by Congress).
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The Supreme Court quickly followed up the Head Money Cases
by deciding Whitney v. Robertson.5 7 The suit involved a claim by
merchants importing sugar from the Dominican Republic. 58 The
merchants argued that they should not have to pay duties be-
cause their goods were similar to goods imported from the Ha-
waiian Islands, which were exempt from duties. 59 Two treaties
and an act of Congress were at issue. The first treaty was be-
tween the United States and the Dominican Republic, and pro-
vided that no higher duty would be imposed by the United States
for the importation of goods from the Dominican Republic than
for like goods from any other foreign nation.60 The second treaty
was between the United States and the King of the Hawaiian Is-
lands.61 That treaty provided for the duty-free importation of spe-
cific Hawaiian goods into the United States in exchange for the
duty-free importation of similar American-made goods into Ha-
waii.6 2 The act of Congress authorized the collection of duties. 63
The Court ruled against the plaintiffs, finding that the Domini-
can treaty was not designed to prevent the giving of special ex-
emptions for sufficient consideration. 64 The Court then ruled that
since the act of Congress was passed after the treaty with the
Dominican Republic, "if there be any conflict between the stipu-
lations of the treaty and the requirements of the law, the latter
must control."65 Finally, the Court put forth the maxim that the
"duty of the courts is to construe and give effect to the latest ex-
pression of the sovereign will" and ended with a reiteration of its
ruling in Head Money Cases.66
Another historic Last in Time decision was The Chinese Exclu-
sion Case.67 The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1888 prohibited the re-
57 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1887).
58 Id. at 190-191 (noting plaintiffs were New York merchants who had imported sugar
from the island of San Domingo).
59 Id. at 191-92 (stating plaintiffs' reliance on the ninth article of the treaty between
United States and Dominican Republic in making a claim).
60 Id. (describing the ninth article of the treaty).
61 Id. at 191 (noting treaty between United States and the King of Hawaii).
62 Whitney, 124 U.S. at 191-92 (1888) (describing relevant provisions of the treaty).
63 Id. at 193 (noting the authorization of duties by the Congressional act at issue).
64 Id. (finding that the treaty with the Dominican Republic "was never designed to pre-
vent special concessions, upon sufficient considerations, touching the importation of spe-
cific articles into the country of the other").
65 Id. at 193-94 (stating the Last in Time rule).
66 Id. at 195 (quoting Head Money Cases decision).
67 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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entry of Chinese laborers who had departed the United States
prior to 1888.68 Chae Chan Ping was excluded from entry into the
United States under the Act.69 He argued that treaties between
the U.S. and China created in 1868 and supplemented in 1880
permitted his entry.7 0 The Chinese Exclusion decision relied
heavily on Head Money Cases and Whitney v. Robertson.71 Em-
phasizing the right of the United States to regulate immigra-
tion, 72 the Court held that "[t]he question whether our govern-
ment is justified in disregarding its engagements with another
nation is not one for the determination of the courts."73 The prior
Last in Time decisions were further cemented into the American
legal lexicon when the Court found that as between treaties and
federal law, "no paramount authority is given to one over the
other" and that the "last expression of the sovereign will must
control." 74 The Court recognized the government's power to
change policy in unforeseen circumstances that may "not only
justify the government in disregarding their stipulations, but
demand in the interests of the country that it should do so."75 Af-
ter adding that questioning the motives of Congress in contra-
dicting a prior treaty is uncalled for,76 the Court ruled against
Ping and upheld the application of the 1888 Act. 77
68 Id. at 589 (noting "the act of Congress of October 1, 1888, prohibiting Chinese labor-
ers from entering the United States who had departed before its passage, having a certifi-
cate issued under the act of 1882 as amended by the act of 1884, granting them permis-
sion to return").
69 See id. at 582 (stating who Chae Chan Ping was); see also John L. Pollack, Note,
Missing "Persons" Expedited Removal, Fong Yue Ting, and the Fifth Amendment, 41
ARmz. L. REV. 1109, 1118 (1999) ("Chae Chan Ping was a Chinese laborer who had lived in
San Francisco since 1875.").
70 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 592-598 (describing history of relations be-
tween United States and China concerning immigration of Chinese labor).
71 Id. at 600-01 (discussing Last-in-Time rule set out in Head Money Cases and Whitney
v. Robertson).
72 Id. at 609 (stating government's right to exclude foreigners "cannot be granted away
or restrained on behalf of anyone.").
73 Id. at 602 (postulating that courts are incompetent to decide whether government is
justified in disregarding international obligations).
74 Id. at 600 (explaining Last in Time rule and reasoning behind it).
75 Id. at 600-01 (justifying court's reliance on Last-in-Time rule).
76 Id. at 602 (observing that "if the power mentioned is vested in Congress, any reflec-
tion upon its motives, or the motives of any of its members in exercising it, would be en-
tirely uncalled for.").
77 See id. at 611 (1889) (affirming Northern District of California's order).
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C. United States Courts' Use of the Last in Time Rule to Strike
Down Prior International Treaties
United States courts continue to use the Last in Time rule as a
way of resolving conflicts between international laws or agree-
ments and federal legislation.78 The application of the rule is not
as simple as it may appear on first reading of the historic Last in
Time decisions described above.
The first important aspect of the Last in Time rule to note is
that courts have traditionally been hesitant to use it5 9 In cases
involving treaties and acts of Congress, courts will do much to
avoid a conflict between the two. If there appears to be a conflict,
the court will only apply the Last in Time rule if the conflict is ir-
reconcilable.80 Unless the court believes that the purpose of the
treaty or Congressional act was clearly to supersede the earlier
act or treaty, it will avoid use of the rule.81 Rather than apply the
rule, the court will construe the text of the treaty or act in a way
where both are congruent or do not intersect at all.8 2
This hesitancy was famously set forth in Chief Justice John
Marshall's opinion in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy.8 3 In
78 Id. at 611 (indicating that the United States has been using the Last in Time rule for
several years); see also Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Symposium, Family Separation as a
Violation of International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 213, 265 (2003) (noting that
"where domestic and international law unavoidably conflict, the Last-In-Time rule nor-
mally applies.").
79 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L. § 114 (1987) ("Where fairly possible, a
United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with
an international agreement of the United States."); see also Julian Ku, Treaties as Laws:
A Defense of the Last in Time Rule for Treaties and Foreign Statutes, THE SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH NETWORK, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=597961 (last visited January 11, 2008) (indicating that the Last-in-Time rule has re-
ceived much criticism in the legal arena).
80 See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 599 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (ruling that in order
to overrule international law, Congress must enact legislation which both postdates the
international law, and clearly has the intent of repealing the international law); see also
Starr, supra note 78, at 265.
81 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L. § 115(1)(a) (1987) (stating that "the
purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision" of the treaty must be clear, or
the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled with the act, for the Last in Time
rule to apply); see also Michael Gerber, The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987. Sabotaging the
United Nations and Holding the Constitution Hostage, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 375 (1990)
(indicating that the court will look for congressional intent).
82 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. L. § 115 Comment (a) (indicating that
courts will construe the act and treaty so that they are not in conflict); see also Gerber,
supra note 81, at 376 (indicating that courts will try to interpret the treaty and law in a
way that is congruently constitutional).
83 6 U.S. 64 (1804).
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that case, the Court ruled that Congressional legislation must
never be construed to violate international law unless the federal
statute has no other possible construction.8 4 The precedent cre-
ated by the Charming Betsy decision was followed in the South-
ern District of New York's decision in United States v. Palestine
Liberation Organization.8 5 There, the conflict was between the
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1988 and the Headquarters Agreement of
the United Nations.8 6 Congress passed the Act in an effort to
close P.L.O. offices located in the United States.8 7 The United
States Attorney General deemed the P.L.O. Observer Mission in
the United Nations to be unlawful under the Act.88 Suit was
brought, and the court found that the Anti-Terrorism Act and the
U.N. Headquarters Agreement were not in conflict.8 9 In a deci-
sion influenced by monist theory, the court reasoned that there
was no clear Congressional intent for the statute to supersede
the Headquarters Agreement. 90 In light of the "long standing and
well-established position of the Mission at the United Nations," 91
the United States' "recognition of a duty to refrain from impeding
the functions of observer missions to the United Nations,"92 and
lack of clear intent to supersede in the text of the Act itself, the
court ruled that "the ATA and the Headquarters Agreement can-
not be reconciled except by finding the ATA inapplicable to the
PLO Observer Mission."93
As seen in Head Money Cases, Whitney v. Robertson, and The
Chinese Exclusion Case, if the act and treaty cannot fairly be rec-
onciled, the Last in Time rule will apply. The most recent act or
84 Chief Justice John Marshall's seminal opinion stated that:
It has also been observed that an act of Congress ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains, and
consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neu-
tral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood
in this country.
Id. at 118.
85 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1459-60.
88 Id. at 1460.
89 Id. at 1471.
90 Id. at 1469-70.
91 Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. at 1465.
92 Id. at 1466.
93 Id. at 1465.
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treaty will prevail over the other.94 It is irrelevant whether the
treaty or the federal legislation is more recent. Courts have held
a prior act of Congress invalid as against a subsequent treaty. 95
The rationale of the Last in Time rule rests upon an assump-
tion made in the reading of the United States Constitution. Arti-
cle VI, Clause II, also known as the Supremacy Clause, declares
that the Constitution, federal law, and treaties are the supreme
law of the land and binding upon the states.96 For this reason,
the conflict must be between federal legislation and a treaty.
Treaties are inherently superior to laws created by state legisla-
tures and no application of the Last in Time rule is necessary to
decide a conflict between a state law and a treaty.97 Since the
language of the clause does not mention any order of priority be-
tween federal law and treaties, the Last in Time rule presumes
that the Framers intended that they be equal.98 Since they are
equal,99 the courts have reasoned that the most recent is control-
ling.100
94 See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 600-01 (applying Last in Time rule);
Whitney, 124 U.S. at 193-94 (stating Last in Time rule).
95 See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (finding that opposite of ordinary
Last in Time conflict is at issue); see also Dolinger, supra note 21, at 1051 (discussing
Cook ruling that "[tireaty between the U.S. and Great Britain, which was later in date
than Tariff Act of 1922, superseded the Act.").
96 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For a brief discussion and the full text of Article VI of
the United States Constitution, see supra note 2.
97 See Jennifer L. Brillante, Note, Continued Violations of International Law by the
United States in Applying the Death Penalty to Minors and Possible Repercussions to the
American Criminal Justice System, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1247, 1255 (stating "a treaty is
superior to state law as well as any state constitution"); see also supra text accompanying
note 5.
98 Compare T. Alexander Aleinkoff, Agora: The United States Constitution and Interna-
tional Law: International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections
on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 A.J.I.L. 91, 100 (2004) (acknowledging
equal status of federal statutes and treaties) with Dolinger, supra note 21, at 1051 (noting
argument that "Supremacy Clause does not necessarily indicate that statutes and treaty
law are on the same level").
99 See Francisco Forrest Martin, Symposium: Is United States Constitutionalism Good
or Bad for International Human Rights?: The Constitution and Human Rights: The Inter-
national Legal Constructionist Approach to Ensuring the Protection of Human Rights, 1
FIU L. REV. 71, 73 (2006) (noting that Last-in-Time rule is "premised on the claim that
federal statutes and treaties have equal legal authority under the Constitution."); Michael
P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 701 n.52 (Treaties
are of the same constitutional dignity as statutes").
100 See Martin, supra note 99, at 73 (noting that a statute can override a treaty if en-
acted after); Van Alstine, supra note 99, at 701 n.52 (In the event of a conflict between the
two, the later in time will prevail.").
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In spite of the apparent reluctance to apply the Last in Time
rule, there has not been a decline in its use over the years. In
fact, courts have been invoking it with greater frequency of
late. 10 1 Breard v. Greene0 2 and the Havana Club Rum case0 3 are
only two examples of decisions influenced by the Last in Time
rule. Recently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided the
rightful owner of the world-famous Cohiba cigar trademark in
Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp. ("Empresa").10 4 In
this case, numerous claims were brought by a state-owned Cuban
manufacturer of hand-made cigars against a United States cor-
poration.10 5 A few of the claims involved multilateral treaties of
which Cuba and the United States were signatories. In a deci-
sion predominantly focused on the embargo between Cuba and
the United States, the Second Circuit supported its dismissal of
Cuba's treaty claims by using the Last in Time rule. 0 6
II. THE LAST IN TIME RULE IN EMPRESA CUBANA DEL TABACO V.
CULBRO CORP.
A. Facts Surrounding the Cohiba Cigar Dispute Between Cuba
and General Cigar
Empresa Cubana does business as Cubatabaco, 0 7 a state-
owned Cuban company that manufactures cigars. 08 One of the
101 See Sheryl Grant, Note, The International Criminal Court: The Nations of the World
Must Not Give in to All of the United States Demands if the Court is to be a Strong, Inde-
pendent, International Organ, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 327, 331 (1999) (In the
last decade courts have increased the use of this last-in-time theory to invalidate portions
of treaties, or even entire treaties"); Detlev F. Vagts, Editorial Comment, Taking Treaties
Less Seriously, 92 A.J.I.L. 458, 459 (1998) (listing decisions using Last in Time rule and
arguing that such invocations "are multiplying").
102 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998). In Breard, the Supreme Court applied the Last in Time
rule to a conflict between the Vienna Treaty of 1969 and the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996.
103 In the Havana Club decision, the Second Circuit used the Last in Time rule to sup-
port its decision that the United States-Cuban embargo prohibited "a Cuban national or
entity from transferring a United States trademark" in spite of claims brought under the
Inter-American Convention. See Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 203 F.3d
116, 124 (2d Cir. 2000).
1 4 399 F.3d 462, 465 (2d Cir. 2005).
105 See id. 464-65.
100 See id. at 481.
107 See id. at 464 (noting that Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco does business as Cubata-
baco).
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cigars it manufactures is Cohiba, 109 which like all Cuban cigars,
is made entirely of Cuban tobacco. 110 Cohiba was created after
the embargo and has never been legally sold in the United
States.1 ' Culbro Corp. is the parent of General Cigar,1 12 a cigar
manufacturer based in the United States. 113
Cohiba began in 1964 as a diplomatic gift of the Cuban gov-
ernment.11 4 Over the years, the mystique of this unusual cigar
increased as word of mouth spread about its quality. 15 Maga-
zines took notice and published articles about this elusive luxury
item. 116 General Cigar [hereinafter General] also got wind of the
prestige associated with Cuba's Cohiba.117 Although Cubatabaco
108 See Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8399, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4935, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2004) (noting "Cubatabaco exports tobacco prod-
ucts").
109 See id. at *10-11 (finding that since 1970 "cigars branded with Cubatabaco's
COHIBA trademark were being produced at the El Laguito factory in Havana").
110 See TAD GAGE, THE COMPLETE IDIOT'S GUIDE TO CIGARS 74 (Alpha Books 1997) (ex-
plaining that Cuban Cigars contain only Cuban tobacco); see also Mark D. Nielsen, Com-
ment, Cohiba: Not Just Another Name, Not Just Another Stogie: Does General Cigar Own
a Valid Trademark for the Name "Cohiba" in the United States?, 21 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 633, 633 (1999) (stating Cuban cigars are from the "'selection of the selec-
tion' of Cuba's tobacco.") (internal citation omitted).
"1 See Empresa, 399 F.3d at 465 (The Embargo Regulations prevent Cuban entities,
such as Cubatabaco, from selling cigars in the United States."); see also Nielsen, supra
note 110, at 633, 636 (discussing the effect of the 1962 embargo on U.S. trade with Cuba);
MIN RON NEE, AN ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POST-REVOLUTION HAVANA CIGARS 61-
63 (Interpro Business Corporation 2003) (describing history of Cohiba cigar brand).
112 See General Cigar Co., Inc. v. Global Direct Mktg., 988 F. Supp. 647, 652 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (explaining that Culbro assigned the Cohiba trademark to its subsidiary, General
Cigar, in 1987); see also Nielsen, supra note 110, at 636 (acknowledging General Cigar as
subsidiary of Culbro Corp.).
113 See Patricia A. Davidson, Tales From the Tobacco Wars: Industry Advertising Tar-
gets Teenage Girls, 13 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 13 n.63 (1998) (noting that cigar consumption
in the United States "doubled from 2.1 to 4.5 billion cigars between 1993 and 1996"); see
also Derrick Z. Jackson, Blowing Cigar Smoke, BOSTON GLOBE, June 4, 1997, at A19 (dis-
cussing the incidence of cigar smoking in Massachusetts).
114 See Nee, supra note 111, at 61 (noting Cohiba's initial status as a diplomatic gift).
115 See Empresa, 399 F.3d at 465-66 (discussing buzz about Cuba's Cohiba cigar); see
also Nielsen, supra note 110, at 633 ("Cuban Cohiba cigars are widely regarded as the
world's finest cigars.").
116 See Empresa, 399 F.3d at 465-66 (noting stories about Cuban Cohiba in Forbes, The
Wine Spectator, and Cigar Aficionado magazines); W.G.F., One-Upmanship, FORBES,
April 21, 1997, at 136 (criticizing the patrons of Club Macanudo on the Upper East Side of
Manhattan, N.Y. for smoking Cuban Cohibas smuggled in from abroad).
117 See Empresa, 399 F.3d at 465-66 (discussing General's acquiring knowledge of
Cuba's Cohiba when one of its executives read an article discussing the cigars in the late
1970's).
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had registered its Cohiba trademark in a number of nations, 118
because of the embargo, it did not do so in the United States. 119
General took advantage of Cuba's hesitancy by registering the
Cohiba trademark unopposed in 1978 and receiving the U.S.
trademark in 1981.120 General initially manufactured its Cohiba
in small quantities solely to preserve its mark.121 In 1982,
Cubatabaco began selling the Cuban Cohiba to the general public
outside of the United States. 122
During the "cigar boom" of the early 1990s 123 the sales of pre-
mium tobacco products skyrocketed in the United States and the
mainstream media took notice. 124 The publication of magazines
like Cigar Aficionado increased consumer awareness of the Cu-
ban Cohiba and it garnered more favorable press than ever be-
fore.125 Once again, General spotted an opportunity and capital-
ized on Cohiba's status as the world's greatest cigar. Having re-
118 Id. at 465-66 ("By January 1978 Cubatabaco had applied to register the COHIBA
mark in seventeen countries, including most Western European countries"); see also Niel-
sen, supra note 110, at 635-36 (noting that Cubatabaco had registered its Cohiba trade-
mark in 115 countries).
119 See Empresa, 399 F.3d at 465-66 (stating Cubatabaco "did not apply to register the
mark in the United States"); see also Nielsen, supra note 110, at 636 (explaining that
"Cuba never registered the Cohiba name in the United States, although it could have").
120 See Empresa, 399 F.3d at 466 (finding General Cigar filed an unopposed application
to register the Cohiba mark in the United States on March 13, 1978 and obtained the reg-
istration on February 17, 1981); see also Nielsen, supra note 110, at 636 (describing that
the United States Patent and Trademark Office approved Culbro's Cohiba trademark ap-
plication in 1981).
121 See Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., No. 97 Civ. 8399, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4935, at *17-18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2004) (discussing sales of General's Cohiba ci-
gar from 1978 to 1987); see also Nielsen, supra note 110, at 636 ( "General Cigar ceased
manufacturing Cohiba between 1988 and 1991, due to waning interest in cigars.").
122 See Nee, supra note 111, at 62 (discussing public unveiling of Cuban Cohiba Cigars);
see also Nielsen, supra note 110, at 635 ("By the early 1980s, Cohiba cigars were commer-
cially available in many countries throughout the world.").
123 See Nielsen, supra note 110, at 636-37 (identifying "cigar craze during the 1990s" as
reason for General's relaunch of its Cohiba cigar); see also W.G.F., supra note 116, at 136
(describing an upscale cigar club, "[w]alk into the wood-paneled Club Macanudo on the
Upper East Side of New York and watch the masters of the universe massacre a fad.").
124 See Empresa, 399 F.3d at 465-66 (discussing media's focus on cigars during the cigar
boom); see also Nielsen, supra note 110, at 649 (discussing the press coverage of Cohiba
cigars).
125 See Empresa, 399 F.3d at 465-66 (noting Cigar Aficionado's rating of Cuban Cohiba).
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registered in 1992,126 General re-launched its Cohiba line in the
United States in November of 1997.127
Shortly after the release of General's "new" Cohiba, Cubata-
baco filed suit in the Southern District of New York. 128 The
Southern District found in favor of Cubatabaco on some of its
claims, 129 permanently enjoined General from using the Cohiba
trademark, and ordered all materials associated with General's
use of the mark "deliver[ed] up to Cubatabaco for destruction or
126 See id. at 466 (stating "General Cigar filed for a second COHIBA registration on De-
cember 30, 1992"); see also Nielsen, supra note 110, at 637 (discussing General's re-
application for a Cohiba's trademark in 1992).
127 See Empresa, 399 F.3d at 466 (noting General Cigar's re-launch of its Cohiba Cigar
"in the fall of 1997"); see also Nielsen, supra note 110, at 637 (discussing the United
States Patent and Trademark Office approval of Culbro's Cohiba trademark re-
application in 1995).
128 See Empresa, 399 F.3d at 466 (noting Cubatabaco's filing on November 12, 1997); see
also Nielsen, supra note 110, at 637-38 (stating that in 1997 Cubatabaco filed a cancella-
tion action against General in the Southern District of New York).
129 Cubatabaco's action alleged thirteen claims against General Cigar. Six claims al-
leged violations of various provisions under the Paris Convention for the Protection of In-
dustrial Property and the Inter-American Convention, and asserted relief under Sections
44 (b) and 44 (h) of the Lanham Act. See Empresa, 399 F.3d at 466. Subtitled "Benefits of
section to persons whose country of origin is party to convention or treaty," section 44 (b)
of the Lanham Act states:
Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or treaty relat-
ing to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or the repression of unfair com-
petition, to which the United States is also a party, or extends reciprocal rights
to nationals of the United States by law, shall be entitled to the benefits of this
section under the conditions expressed herein to the extent necessary to give
effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or reciprocal law, in addition
to the rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this Act.
15 U.S.C.S. § 1126(b) (2006). Section 44 (h) states:
Any person designated in subsection (b) of this section as entitled to the bene-
fits and subject to the provisions of this Act shall be entitled to effective protec-
tion against unfair competition, and the remedies provided herein for in-
fringement of marks shall be available so far as they may be appropriate in
repressing acts of unfair competition.
15 U.S.C.S. § 1126(h) (2006). Cubatabaco also alleged various claims involving section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, including that Cubatabaco was entitled to relief under the fa-
mous marks doctrine and that General engaged in false representation by stating that
their tobacco was grown from Cuban seed. Empresa, 399 F.3d at 467. Finally, Cubatabaco
argued that General's actions would dilute its Cohiba mark in violation of New York Gen-
eral Business Law § 360. Id. The Southern District found that General had infringed on
Cubatabaco's Cohiba mark, which was sufficiently famous for protection, and that there
was a likelihood of confusion between the marks. Empresa, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4935,
at *152-53 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2004). The Southern District dismissed the rest of Cubata-
baco's claims. Id. at *153-69.
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other disposition." 130 Both parties subsequently appealed to the
Second Circuit. 131
B. The Second Circuit's Focus on the Embargo
In deciding the issues before it, the Second Circuit placed great
importance on the existence of the embargo between the United
States and Cuba.1 32 Nearly every claim was decided in whole or
in part by the federal laws codifying the economic blockade. 133 In
answering whether Cubatabaco had any right to relief under the
famous mark doctrine of the Lanham Act,134 the court found that
in the absence of a specific or general license, 135 the embargo
prohibited Cuba from acquiring any property rights within the
United States. 13 6
130 Id. at *153.
131 Empresa, 399 F.3d at 464-65 (noting both Cubatabaco and General appealed the
Southern District's decision).
132 Id. at 465 (holding that the embargo bars Cubatabaco's acquisition of the COHIBA
mark and therefore all Cubatabaco's claims must be dismissed).
133 Id. The court relied heavily on the Lanham Act.
134 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act "allows [a] trademark holder to obtain trademark
protection in foreign countries without registration, and more importantly, use in that
country." See Alisa Cahan, Note, China's Protection of Famous and Well-Known Marks:
The Impact of China's Latest Trademark Law Reform on Infringement and Remedies, 12
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 219, 220 (2004). Section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act states:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any con-
tainer for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which--
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the af-
filiation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, charac-
teristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods,
services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(a)(1) (2006).
135 See Empresa, 399 F.3d at 473 (positing that general or specific licenses provide ex-
ceptions to prohibitions provided for in the Embargo Regulations); see also U.S. Depart-
ment of State, Consular Information Sheet: Cuba, Jan. 8, 2007, available at
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis-pa-tw/cis/cis_1097.html (last visited January 11, 2008)
(explaining that U.S. regulations require that persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction be li-
censed, either generally or specifically, to engage in any transactions related to travel to,
from, and within Cuba).
136 Empresa, 399 F.3d at 473 (noting that absent a general or specific license "the Regu-
lations prohibits a transfer of property rights, including trademark rights, to a Cuban en-
tity by a person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States").
LAST!N TIME RULE
The court quickly dismissed Cubatabaco's claim that General's
use of the mark violated section 43(a) of the Lanham Act by caus-
ing consumer confusion. 137 The court reasoned that because the
embargo prohibited Cubatabaco from owning the U.S. Cohiba
trademark, it could not win relief on the basis that another's law-
ful use of the mark would cause confusion. 138
C. The Second Circuit's Reliance on the Last In Time Rule in
Resolving Cuba's Paris Convention Claims
The court also emphasized United States federal law in resolv-
ing one of Cubatabaco's international treaty claims against Gen-
eral.13 9 Cubatabaco asserted protected trademark interests under
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 140
a multilateral treaty that both Cuba and the United States are
bound by. 141
Cubatabaco argued that even if it was barred from receiving
ownership of the Cohiba mark, it had a "right under Article 6 bis
of the Paris Convention, 142 in conjunction with Sections 44(b) and
137 Id. at 478-79 (discussing Cubatabaco's consumer confusion claim).
138 Id. ("Cubatabaco cannot obtain relief on a theory that General Cigar's use of the
mark causes confusion, because, pursuant to our holding today, General Cigar's legal
right to the COHIBA mark has been established as against Cubatabaco").
139 Id. at 476 (stating that Cubatabaco's claims for injunctive relief based on the Paris
Convention fail because they entail a transfer if property rights to Cubatabaco in violation
of the embargo).
140 See generally Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
as revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at
http://www.bitlaw.comlsource/treaties/paris.html (last visited January 11, 2008). The
Paris Convention is one of the most important international treaties protecting intellec-
tual property. Signed in 1883, the Paris Convention's objective is to protect "patents, util-
ity models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, indications of
source or appellations of origin, and the repression of unfair competition." See Evelyn Su,
Comment, The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights and its Effects on Developing Countries, 23 Hous. J. INT'L L. 169,
178-79 (2000).
141 The Paris Convention was signed by over 100 countries. Su, supra note 140, at 178.
Both the United States and Cuba are signatories. See Nielsen, supra note 110, at 644.
142 Article 6 bis provides:
(1) The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation so per-
mits, or at the request of an interested party, to refuse or to cancel the regis-
tration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduc-
tion, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark
considered by the competent authority of the country of registration or use to
be well known in that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to
the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or similar goods. These
provisions shall also apply when the essential part of the mark constitutes a
reproduction of any such well-known mark or an imitation liable to create con-
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(h) of the Lanham Act,143 to obtain cancellation of General Cigar's
mark and an injunction against its use."144 The court conceded
that Cubatabaco was correct in arguing "that Sections 44(b) and
(h) incorporate Article 6 bis and allow foreign entities to acquire
U.S. trademark rights in the United States if their marks are
sufficiently famous in the United States before they are used in
this country"145 but found the argument irrelevant. 146 The em-
bargo prevented any Cuban entity from acquiring property rights
under the famous marks doctrine of the Lanham Act whether it
was read in conjunction with Article 6 bis of the Paris Conven-
tion or not.147
The decision against Cubatabaco was supported by the Last in
Time rule. 148 The court used the rule to establish the embargo's
binding power as subsequent federal law over prior multilateral
treaties. 149 After deciding that the embargo barred recovery un-
der the Paris Convention, the court stated: "In any event, to the
extent that the Paris Convention, standing alone, might pose an
irreconcilable conflict to the [Embargo] Regulations, the latter
will prevail."'150 The Second Circuit found the most recent em-
bargo codification, the Libertad Act of 1996,151 later in time than.
the most recent ratification of the Paris Convention in 1970.152
Since the federal law was later in time than the treaty and irrec-
oncilable, the court ruled that the embargo would control. 153 The
fusion therewith.
(2) A period of at least five years from the date of registration shall be allowed
for requesting the cancellation of such a mark. The countries of the Union may
provide for a period within which the prohibition of use must be requested.
(3) No time limit shall be fixed for requesting the cancellation or the prohibi-
tion of the use of marks registered or used in bad faith.
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, supra note 140.
143 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
144 See Empresa, 399 F.3d at 479 (discussing Cubatabaco's argument).
145 Id. at 480 (acknowledging soundness of Cubatabaco's assessment).
146 Id. at 481 (finding that "the embargo bars Cubatabaco from acquiring property
rights in the U.S. COHIBA mark through the doctrine.").
147 Id. (discussing the Cuban embargo).
148 Id. at 481 (applying Last in Time rule to Cubatabaco's Paris Convention claims).
149 Id. (stating "legislative acts trump treaty-made international law' when those acts
are passed subsequent to ratification of the treaty and clearly contradict treaty obliga-
tions.") (internal citation omitted).
150 Id. at 481.
151 Id. (finding that "the Regulations were reaffirmed and codified in 1996 with the pas-
sage of the LIBERTAD Act").
152 Id. (noting that the 1970 ratification of the Paris Convention is earlier in time than
Libertad Act of 1996).
153 See id. (ruling that the later statute shall prevail over prior treaty).
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court ended its discussion of the issue by stating that "any claim
grounded in the Paris Convention that presented an irreconcil-
able conflict with the Regulations would be rendered 'null' by the
Regulations." 5 4
III. THE LAST IN TIME RULE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO
MULTILATERAL TREATIES THAT CONFLICT WITH SUBSEQUENT
DOMESTIC LAW
A. The Last In Time Rule's Application in the International Law
Context is Questionable Under Article VI, Clause 11 of the
United States Constitution
It could be argued that the Constitution is purposely vague. 155
Intending the celebrated document to be the blueprint of the na-
tion for years to come, the Framers made its language broad in
scope so that it would be adaptable to unforeseeable changes in
the nation and world at large.156 This is evidenced by the lan-
guage of Article VI, Clause II, also known as the Supremacy
Clause, which mandates that the Constitution, federal law, and
treaties of the United States are superior to the laws of the
states. 157 The Supremacy Clause does not state the order of supe-
riority of the laws as between themselves. 58 Consequently, it
does not explicitly direct courts in deciding whether a treaty
should prevail over federal law nor whether the Constitution
overcomes treaties. This has led to numerous conflicts as de-
tailed throughout this comment. In light of the controversy, it is
important that federal courts recognize that the debate exists
154 Empresa, 399 F.3d at 481 (2005).
155 See Marian Nash Leich, U.S. Practice, 78 A.J.I.L. 427, 439-40 (1984) (characterizing
Article VI's language as vague and sweepingly general); see also Michael P. Kelly, Fixing
the War Powers, 141 MIL. L. REV. 83, 103 ("The Constitution is a 'blueprint' for national
government, and the framers intentionally crafted a document suited for such a task.").
156 See Charles A. Rees, Preserved or Pickled?: The Right to Trial by Jury After the
Merger of Law and Equity in Maryland, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 301, 381 n.591 (noting
"courts generally have been willing to read the broad language of the Constitution to ac-
count for changing social conditions") (internal citation omitted); see also Kelly, supra note
155, at 103.
157 For a brief discussion and the full text of Article VI of the United States Constitu-
tion, see supra text accompanying note 2.
158 "This Constitution, and the law of the United States ... and all treaties made . ..
shall be the supreme law of the land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 11.
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and make exacting law ensuring that the intent of the Framers
and long-term interests of the United States are not betrayed.
Although not explicitly stated in the Supremacy Clause, it has
been generally agreed by courts and legal scholars that the
Framers intended the Constitution to be the ultimate law, with
authority over federal law and multilateral treaties. 159 This as-
sumption is a sound one because Congressional legislation must
be Constitutional under Article I, Section Eight of the Constitu-
tion.1 60 Moreover, it is highly doubtful that the Framers intended
to give international law or treaties the power to amend or re-
voke part or all of our Constitution.16' The assumption that the
Supreme Court made in the initial Last in Time decisions is not
quite as persuasive however.
In order to fashion the Last in Time rule, the Supreme Court
relied on the fact that Article VI, Clause II describes both trea-
ties and "Laws of the United States" as supreme without distin-
guishing between the two. 162 This lack of distinction was one of
the bases for the logical leap that treaties and federal law are
equal and whichever is most recent should control. 163 There are
problems with that assumption however and it should be ques-
tioned in future decisions.
The first problem with the assumption is that it ignores the
fact that the Supremacy Clause does not make any distinctions
159 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (ruling treaties must be Constitu-
tional); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115(3) (1987) (stat-
ing that treaties will not be given effect if they are inconsistent with the United States
Constitution).
160 Article I, Section VIII of the Constitution grants Congress the authority to enact
specific types of legislation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
161 See Dolinger, supra note 21, at 1052 (arguing that the "Supremacy Clause obviously
did not intend to equate all federal law, for it lists the Constitution as well as laws and
treaties as supreme law of the land, and surely laws and treaties are not equal as law to
the Constitution"); see also Vincent Mulier, Recognizing the Full Scope of the Right to
Take Fish Under the Stevens Treaties, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 41, n. 132.
162 For a full discussion of the Supreme Court rulings in the seminal Last in Time cases,
see supra Part I.B.
163 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (failing to explain which of the "supreme law[s] of the
land" will be most supreme); see also Curtis A. Bradley and Jack Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 815, 842 (1997) (stating, "The Supremacy Clause declares both treaties and 'Laws
of the United States' to be 'the supreme Law of the Land.' In Whitney v. Robertson, the
Supreme Court interpreted this clause to mean that 'no superior efficacy is given to either
over the other.' One consequence of Whitney's logic is that a conflict between treaties and
statutes is resolved by a last-in-time rule. Courts will give effect to a later act of Congress
inconsistent with an earlier treaty, and vice-versa.")
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between any of the forms of law that are listed as supreme. Tex-
tually, the Constitution, federal law and treaties are not given
explicit priority in Article VI, Clause II. In the initial Last in
Time rulings, 164 the Court assumed that the Framers intended
equality among two of the supreme laws based primarily on the
fact that the clause was silent.165 That assumption is erroneous
because that silence applies to all three types of law. If the ra-
tionale underlying the initial Last in Time rule decisions was ap-
plied to the Supremacy Clause in its entirety, all three bodies of
law would be equal, creating a logical but undesired result. 166
Since the Constitution is recognized as the supreme law of the
United States, the Court should not have hastily presumed that
treaties and federal law were equal when there is evidence that
they should not be.
Mexican courts have come to an antithetical conclusion. Arti-
cle 133 of the Mexican Constitution is textually similar to Article
VI, Clause II of the United States Constitution. 167 It lists the
Mexican "Constitution, the laws of the Congress of the Union
that come from it, and all the treaties that are in accord with it"
as supreme. Although there is a stronger implication of Consti-
tutional superiority in Mexico's Constitution,1 68 neither Article
133 nor Article VI, Clause II imply or explicitly state the status
of domestic laws and treaties. Mexican courts have interpreted
this ambiguity in Article 133 to mandate that international trea-
164 In the three cases discussed in Section I of this comment the Supreme Court stated
that it would invalidate United States treaties as far as they conflicted with subsequent
acts of Congress. See supra Part I.B.
'65 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (stating that the "supreme law of the
land" consists of three things); see also David Cinotti, The New Isolationism: Non-Self
Execution Declarations and Treaties as the Supreme Law of the Land, 91 GEO. L.J. 1277,
1285 (2003) (arguing that the Framers intended that treaties be on equal footing with
Congressional legislation).
166 Missouri, 252 U.S. at 416 (1920) (holding that although "a treaty stands upon equal
footing with a law of the United States .... there must be a limit, else that power would
destroy many of the other provisions of the Constitution."). But see Joseph Story, Com-
mentaries on the Constitution of the United States 3, §1831 (1833) available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a6-2s42.html (last visited January 11,
2008) (positing that treaties should equally be the "supreme law of the land").
167 For the full text of Article VI of the United States Constitution and Article 133 of the
Mexican Constitution, see supra text accompanying notes 2 and 27.
168 Article 133 lists only treaties that are "in accord" with the Constitution as supreme.
Art. VI, cl. 2 is not as explicit. See supra notes 2 and 27.
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ties shall control domestic law whether prior or subsequent. 169
The fact that a nation with a Supremacy Clause so similar to our
own has come to a completely different reading of its constitution
lends credence to the belief that the Last in Time decisions may
have been wrongly decided. This belief is further strengthened
when one examines the intent of the Framers. 170
Writing as Publius, founding father and first Supreme Court
Chief Justice John Jay,171 spoke directly to the power of treaties
in The Federalist No. 64.172 Characterizing treaties as bargains,
Jay conceded that treaties could be amended and repealed.
173
However, Jay argued vehemently that such amendments and re-
peals must be done with the approval of both parties to the
agreement.174 Moreover, he noted that no other nation would sign
a treaty if its provisions would only be binding on the United
States "so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by
169 Mexican courts have read Article 133 to place treaties above domestic legislation.
See Dr. Luis Miguel Diaz, National Treaty Law and Practice: Mexico, in NATIONAL
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 27, at 452-53; see also Alejandro Lopez-Velarde,
Trademarks in Mexico: The Effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 17
Hous. J. INT'L L. 49, 85 (1994); James F. Smith & Marilyn Whitney, The Dispute Settle-
ment Mechanism of the NAFTA and Agriculture, 68 N.D. L. REV. 567, 602 n.195 (1992).
170 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay).
171 See Joel Jacobsen, Remembered Justice: The Background, Early Career and Judicial
Appointments of Justice Potter Stewart, 35 AKRON L. REV. 227, 250 n.149 (2002) ("The
first Chief Justice, John Jay, was 43 years and 10 months old when confirmed."); Ilene
Knable Gotts et al., Nature vs. Nurture and Reaching the Age of Reason: The U.S. 1E. U.
Treatment of Transatlantic Mergers, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 453, 460 (2005) (noting
Jay's status as a founding father).
172 The discussion of treaties in Federalist No. 64 noted above states:
Others, though content that treaties should be made in the mode proposed, are
averse to their being the SUPREME laws of the land. They insist, and profess
to believe, that treaties like acts of assembly, should be repealable at pleasure.
This idea seems to be new and peculiar to this country, but new errors, as well
as new truths, often appear. These gentlemen would do well to reflect that a
treaty is only another name for a bargain, and that it would be impossible to
find a nation who would make any bargain with us, which should be binding on
them ABSOLUTELY, but on us only so long and so far as we may think proper
to be bound by it. They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal
them; and it will not be disputed that they who make treaties may alter or can-
cel them; but still let us not forget that treaties are made, not by only one of
the contracting parties, but by both; and consequently, that as the consent of
both was essential to their formation at first, so must it ever afterwards be to
alter or cancel them. The proposed Constitution, therefore, has not in the least
extended the obligation of treaties. They are just as binding, and just as far be-
yond the lawful reach of legislative acts now, as they will be at any future pe-
riod, or under any form of government.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay).
173 Id. (arguing that treaties should be "repealable at pleasure").
174 See THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay) (stating the consent of both parties to be a
requirement that applies to treaty amendments and repeals as well as treaty formation).
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it."175 Alexander Hamilton, Framer of the Constitution and fellow
writer of the Federalist papers, stated in The Defence, No. 38
that it was the intent of the Constitutional Convention that trea-
ties would "control and bind the legislative power of Congress." 176
Such unequivocal language by prominent founding fathers has
led some legal scholars to question the Last in Time decisions
and their progeny. 177 In spite of this evidence, the Court refused
to probe into the intent of the Framers in the initial Last in Time
decisions. Had the Court considered this powerful evidence it
may have crafted a different rule granting more deference to
multilateral treaties.
The second problem with the Court's reading of the Supremacy
Clause is that the Last in Time rule was improperly decided at
an inappropriate time. In the first cases in which it appeared,
the Last in Time rule existed solely in dicta. The Court was ca-
pable of deciding the cases before it without deciding the status
of federal law and treaties, 178 and in the opinion of this author, it
should have continued this practice. However, since the Court
felt it necessary to overstep the bounds of the facts before it, it
should have engaged in a thorough discussion that carefully ex-
amined factors relevant to determining the priority of federal
laws with respect to treaties. Unfortunately, this issue was not
given the care that it deserved. Had the Court looked deeper into
the record of the Framers' intent, it may have found that treaties
175 Id.
1
76 THE DEFENCE No. 38 (Alexander Hamilton) (1796).
177 Compare Phillip R. Trimble, Book Review and Note, 90 A.J.I.L. 693, 694 (1996) (re-
viewing JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1996))
(characterizing statements by John Jay in the Federalist papers as saying "that treaties
are superior to legislation"), and Carlos Manuel Vasquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-
Executing Treaties, 89 A.J.I.L. 695, 696 n.9 (1995) (stating Last in Time rule has been at-
tacked as "inconsistent with the Framers' intent"), and Scott R. Morris, Killing Egyptian
Prisoners of War: Does the Phrase "Lest We Forget" Apply to Israeli War Criminals?, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 903, 948 n.199 (1996) (noting increased criticism of Last in Time
rule), with Ku, supra note 48, at 375-77 (arguing Federalist No. 64 does not contradict
Last in Time rule).
178 The Court in The Head Money Cases admitted that its formulation of the Last in
Time rule was unnecessary for its decision as the act of Congress and treaty were not
found in conflict. See Edye, 112 U.S. at 597. The Court noted that in this case no foreign
country complained about the application of the statute as violating treaty obligations. In
1870, the Supreme Court in Miller v. United States declined to resolve the issue of
whether international treaties limited the congressional war power, instead reconciling
international law with the statute in question. See also Jules Lobel, The Limits of Consti-
tutional Power: Conflicts between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV.
1071, 1103 (1985).
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should be directly underneath the Constitution, whether earlier
or later in time.179 At the very least, it would have found that the
intent was inconclusive180 and that the Court would need to dis-
cuss and weigh factors related to three possible outcomes: trea-
ties and federal laws being equal with the Last in Time rule re-
solving conflicts; treaties controlling federal law; or federal law
being superior to treaties. Given the statements of Jay and
Hamilton and the lack of explicit direction from the Constitution
itself, the Court's untimely and underdeveloped finding was ar-
guably incorrect and certainly debatable.181
B. Global Changes in the Past Century Have Made the Last in
Time Rule Outdated Precedent
The initial Last in Time cases were decided over a hundred
years ago. 182 The world in which the rule was created was mark-
edly different from the world today. In 1884 (the year Head
Money Cases was decided) the cornerstone of the Statue of Lib-
erty was laid on Bedloe's Island in New York Harbor.18 3 When
Whitney v. Robertson was decided four years later, slavery had
179 See Lobel, supra note 178, at 1094 (reflecting Framers' understanding that interna-
tional treaty law limited power of federal government during ratification debates follow-
ing the Constitutional Convention); see also Kenneth C. Randall, Foreign Affairs in the
Next Century, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2104 (1991) (reviewing Louis HENKIN,
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990)) (noting importance of
consulting the Framers' original intent to interpret constitutional ambiguities about for-
eign affairs).
180 See Lobel, supra note 178, at 1100-01 (stating early leaders' uncertainty regarding
the ambiguous relationship between treaties, customary law, and subsequent statutes);
see also Vasquez, supra note 177, at 696 n.9 (arguing that Framers' intent is uncertain).
's1 See Stewart Jay, Essay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42
VAND. L. REV. 819, 828 (1989) (noting the prevalent notion in eighteenth-century juris-
prudence that the federal government lacked the power to alter treaties); see also Lobel,
supra note 179, at 1095-96 (pointing to Jay's argument that the Constitution affirmed
treaties as beyond the legislature's reach as well as Hamilton's suggestion that the judi-
ciary was bound by international law).
lS2The Chinese Exclusion Case was decided 118 years ago. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). Whitney
v. Robertson was decided 119 years ago. 124 U.S. 190 (1888). The Head Money Cases was
decided 123 years ago in 1884. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
1s3 See Freedom Timeline: Statue of Liberty, http://www.whitehouse.gov/kids
/timeline/statue.html (last visited January 11, 2008) (noting that the Statue of Liberty
was presented to the people of America on July 4, 1884); see also Statue of Liberty Facts,
http://www.endex.com/gflbuildings/libertyllibertyfacts.htm (last visited January 11, 2008)
(stating that Statue was completed in France in 1884 and presented to America on July
4).
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just been abolished in Brazil18 4 and Jack the Ripper was on the
loose in London. 18 5 At the time of The Chinese Exclusion Case,
Benjamin Harrison was President of the United States. 86 This
comment does not argue that these differences alone should pro-
voke the questioning of legal precedent as accepted as the Last in
Time rule. It argues that the way that the world has changed
and the relevance of those changes to the continued application
of the rule should provoke an inquiry into this issue by United
States courts.
Over the past century, there has been an astonishing increase
in the contact between nations. 8 7 Naturally, an explosion of in-
ternational trade coincided with the increase in relations. 88 This
phenomenon occurred for a number of reasons. The movement of
goods has been facilitated by an exponential increase in technol-
184 See BBC News, Brazil Unveils Anti-Slavery Plan, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi
/americas/2842219.stm (last visited January 11, 2008) (stating that Brazil officially abol-
ished slavery in 1888); see also Brazilian Embassy in Washington, Brazil and the U.S.,
http://www.brasilemb.org/profilebrazillbrazil-usa-war.shtml (last visited January 11,
2008) (describing the end to gradual abolition process in 1888 when Princess Isabel signed
the Golden Law).
185 See Martin K. Wiener, Book Review, 14 LAW & HIST. REV. 131, 134 (1996) (stating
that press coverage increased when reporting the Jack the Ripper murders in 1888); see
also METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE, THE ENDURING MYSTERY OF JACK THE RIPPER,
http://www.met.police.uklhistory/ripper.htm (last visited January 11, 2008) (noting that
in the years 1888-1891, Jack the Ripper inspired terror in London's East End).
186 See Von Russell Creel, Challenge and Opportunity: The First Year of the United
States Court for the Indian Territory, 30 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 295, 295 (2005) (noting that
Benjamin Harrison succeeded Grover Cleveland on March 4, 1889); see also Judith
Kilpatrick, Article, (Extra) Ordinary Men: African-American Lawyers and Civil Rights in
Arkansas Before 1950, 53 ARK. L. REV. 299, 319 n.127 (acknowledging that Benjamin
Harrison was elected President in 1888).
187 See UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA: PROCEEDINGS IN THE
UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw ISSUES 226 (Michael Krinsky & David Golove
eds., Aletheia Press 1993) ("We live in a world of increasing economic interdependence");
see also Lee M. Caplan, Article, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Cri-
tique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 A.J.I.L. 741, 758 (2003) (noting globalization
increasingly brought states and private merchants into contact).
188 See Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority and International Investment Law, 20 AM. U.
INT'L L. Rev. 465, 466 (2005) (noting "dramatic increase in cross-border investments" that
coincided with globalization); see also John D. Jackson, Playing the Culture Card in Re-
sisting Cross-Jurisdictional Transplants: A Comment on "Legal Processes and National
Culture," 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 51, 57 (1997) (pointing to "increased interna-
tional communication and travel, increased international trade, the growth in number
and reach of international organizations, the internationalization of business and tech-
nology, [and] increasing awareness of the international consequences of phenomena for-
merly regarded as national" as contributing to the homogenization of western cultures).
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ogy. 189 The commercial use of jet airplanes1 90 and the construc-
tion of enormous ships to transport truck containers have made
it possible to move goods to distant nations. 191 Moreover, the in-
creased sophistication of communication devices allows entrepre-
neurs from around the globe to conduct business in an extremely
efficient manner. 192 Finally, the ability to do business with far off
lands has led to multinational corporations 193 and organizations
designed to limit interference with the interests of global com-
merce. 194 These are just a few reasons why many nations, the
United States in particular, 195 have been able to participate in
189 See Thomas Cottier, Symposium, The New Global Technology Regime: The Impact of
New Technologies on Multilateral Trade Regulation and Governance, 72 CHI.-KENT. L.
REV. 415, 416 (1996) ("[Tlechnology allows for the relatively inexpensive transportation of
goods and services and accounts for an unprecedented growth of international trade since
the end of World War II."); see also Rex Honey, Symposium, Interrogating the Globaliza-
tion Project, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2002) (observing that
"[c]ommunication technology and the development of global markets allow people to buy
and sell on all continents without so much as leaving their homes.").
1- See Francis Cardinal George, O.M.I., Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 2
(2003) (associating globalization with advent of jet travel); FAA, ADMINISTRATOR'S FACT
BOOK 18 (August 2005), available at http://www.atctraining.faa.gov/site/factbooks.htm
(citing jet as leader in U.S. Air Carrier Activity numbers).
19, See Edwin R. Render, How Would Today's Employees Fare in a Recession?, 4 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 37, 37 (2001) (associating globalization with "new economy" industries
such as trucking); see also Narayan Rangaraj & N. Viswanadham, An Example of a Sup-
ply Chain Involving Multi Modal Containerised Transport, available at
www.me.iitb.ac.in/-narayantransport/multi-modal-supply-chain.pdf (last visited Janu-
ary 11, 2008) (noting the increase in movement of goods by containerised mode in India
and South Asia).
192 See Cottier, supra note 189, at 425-26 (stating that communication is essential for
international trade because it reduces transaction costs, makes information and global
interaction available, contributes to economic growth, and fosters cooperative exchange);
see also Sharon K. Hom & Eric K. Yamamoto, Symposium, Collective Memory, History,
and Social Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1747, 1778 (2000) (noting that globalization is
marked by new tools of technology including cellular phones, the internet, and media
networks).
193 See Matthew W. Barrier, Regionalization: The Choice of a New Millennium, 9
CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L.J. 25, 25 (2000) (noting that approximately 70% of world trade is
involving multinational corporations); see also Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Accounting:
Where Internet Meets Geography, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 261, 264 (2000) (describing multina-
tional corporations as big players in globalization).
194 See Hom and Yamamoto, supra note 192, at 1778 (observing regional and global
trade organizations and NGOs formed as result of globalization); see also Mark J. Mur-
phy, International Bribery: An Example of an Unfair Trade Practice?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 385, 388 (1995) (citing formation of European Union as evidence of globalization); Jef-
frey S. Thomas, Should Canadian Labor be Concerned About NAFTA?, 27 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 883, 895 (1994) (describing North American Free Trade Agreement as a response to
globalization).
195 See Michel Rosenfeld, Symposium, Derrida's Ethical Turn and America: Looking
Back From the Crossroads of Global Terrorism and the Enlightenment, 27 CARDOZO L.
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and have benefited from increased commercial contact with the
international community at large. Moreover, this growth in for-
eign trade has altered the means of international agreements. 196
Prior to the second half of the twentieth century the law of na-
tions was predominately made of bilateral treaties. 197 The end of
World War II and the increase in global relations fostered the de-
velopment of multilateral treaties as the primary method of in-
ternational governance.1 98
The increase in contact between nations has amplified the sig-
nificance of a nation's reputation in the international commu-
nity. 99 This importance is magnified by the advancing communi-
cation technology and advent of multilateral treaties because
news of a nation's reputation is likely to travel quickly to a large
number of potential trading partners. A country that is known to
be disloyal or neglectful in performing its obligations is less likely
REV. 815, 824 (2005) (asserting the United States "negotiating the passage from the Cold
War to globalization"); see also U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, DOING BUSINESS IN INTERNATIONAL
MARKETS, http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/cba (last visited April 10, 2007) (describing Ameri-
can governmental efforts to provide commercial information and market opportunities to
American businesses abroad).
196 See Jennifer L. Hagerman, Navigating the Waters of International Employment Law:
Dispute Avoidance Tactics for United States-Based Multinational Corporations, 41 VAL. U.
L. REV. 859, 862 (2006) (stating the necessity for labor treaties due to the "[d]ramatic in-
creases in international trade"); Jessica Thrope, A Question of Intent: Choice of Law and
the International Arbitration Agreement, 54 Nov. DISP. RESOL. J. 16, 17 (1999) (arguing
that the need for international arbitration agreements has become a necessary expedient
due to the "unprecedented growth of international trade").
197 See Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 A.J.I.L. 529, 529 (1993)
("Early international law dealt with bilateral relations between autonomous states.");
Claudio Grossman, Building the World Community: Challenges to Legal Education and
the WCL Experience, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 815, 824 (2002) (characterizing early interna-
tional law as dealing "mainly with bilateral relations between sovereign states").
198 See Jonathan I. Charney, supra note 197, at 78 (1982) (noting multilateral treaty
negotiations as major development in aftermath of World War II); Christopher D. Stone,
Common but Differentiated Responses in International Law, 98 A.J.I.L. 276, 300 (2004)
(stating "number and reach of multilateral treaties has increased"); John H. Knox, The
Myth and Reality of Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, 96 A.J.I.L. 291,
319 (2002) (noting "increasing number and scope of multilateral agreements").
199 See Ian Johnstone, Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive Communities,
12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371, 391 (1991) (noting that nations shy away from "far-fetched" in-
terpretations of treaties because they "have a stake in maintaining a reputation for good
faith compliance with treaty commitments"); David Golove, Human Rights Treaties and
the U.S. Constitution, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 579, 606 (2002) ("Perhaps most importantly,
ratifying human rights treaties bolsters the reputation and influence of the United States
in promoting human rights.").
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to be the leader of the global trade network.200 Although the
United States' power and wealth has helped mask the impor-
tance of reputation thus far, there is speculation among legal
scholars that the mask is beginning to slip.201 When looked at in
conjunction with the statements of John Jay and Alexander
Hamilton, the Last in Time rule appears even less appropriate
given changes over the lifetime of the United States. The state-
ments of the Framers who felt that international law should take
precedent over domestic law were made at a time when global-
ization had not yet reached its peak and agreements between na-
tions were generally bilateral. Multitudes of nations are now en-
tering binding multilateral agreements in rising numbers,
increasing the harm done to our international standing.202 The
abrogation of those treaties by the current use of the Last in
Time rule for domestic purposes is problematic and arguably of-
fensive to the intent of the creators of the United States.
C. The United States Harms Its Reputation by Disregarding
International Obligations for Domestic Purposes
The harm done to the United States' increasingly important
global reputation is another reason why the application of the
Last in Time rule to multilateral treaties should be seriously
questioned if not overruled. The rule is capable of damaging the
outside world's perceptions in a number of ways. Not only may
the rule be harmful but, as seen in Empresa, the upheld Con-
gressional acts themselves may be injurious.20 3
200 See FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay) (discussing global credibility); Vagts, supra note
101, at 461-62 (criticizing United States use of Last in Time rule).
201 See Vagts, supra note 101, at 461-62 (highlighting United States' minimization of in-
ternational obligations and arguing that "[a] reputation for playing fast and loose with
treaty commitments can only do harm to our capacity to be a leader in the post-Cold War
world"); Sean D. Murphy, Foreword Lawyers and Wars: Asymposium Issue in Honor of
Edward R. Cummings, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 493, 498 (2006) (mentioning the idea
that the United States' detention of combatants in the "war on terror" may be "impairing
the United States' reputation, and in turn its ability to project 'soft power' abroad").
202 See John King Gamble, Human-Centric International Law: A Model and a Search for
Empirical Indicators, 14 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 61, 72 (2005) (noting the increase in
multilateral treaties and commenting that "the metaphor of a rising tide seems appropri-
ate"); Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STAN. LAW. REV. 1789, 1790
(2003) (stating that the number of multilateral treaties registered with the United Na-
tions has increased 400% in "just over two decades").
210 Empresa, 399 F.3d at 472-73 (2005) (discussing the embargo statute); see 31 C.F.R. §
515.201(b) (2004) (prohibiting property transactions with designated countries).
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The very existence of the Last in Time rule may damage
American global interests. Depending on the scope of the federal
law, the rule allows Congress to modify and even nullify multi-
lateral treaties for reasons unlikely to be questioned by United
States courts. 20 4 This sends a message to the international com-
munity that the United States is capable of dishonoring its obli-
gations under fairly negotiated treaties. Moreover, the courts'
frequent use of the Last in Time rule eats away at the good will
that the United States enjoys around the world. The list of deci-
sions 20 5 utilizing this rule demonstrates to the rest of the world
that not only is America able to ignore international treaties for
domestic purposes, it has done so with notable frequency.
The federal laws given priority over prior multilateral treaties
are often offensive to both allies and adversaries of the United
States.20 6 The embargo that took center stage in Empresa is a
great example of how the act of Congress itself further damages
America's reputation. Signed into law by President John F.
Kennedy in 1962,207 the embargo was a response to the Cuban
revolution of 1959 led by Fidel Castro and Ernesto "Che"
Guevara. 208 It was initially justified by Cuba's alliance with the
Soviet Union 20 9 but little changed after communist Russia's
204 In the three seminal cases discussed in Section I of this comment the Supreme Court
stated that it would invalidate United States treaties as far as they conflicted with subse-
quent acts of Congress. See supra Part I.B.
205 In addition to the Last in Time decisions noted in this comment, numerous recent
examples can be found in various federal jurisdictions. See Kappus v. Comm'r, 358 U.S.
App. D.C. 11 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Estate of Silver v. Comm'r, 120 T.C. 430 (2003); Pekar v.
Comm'r, 113 T.C. 158 (1999); Hilario v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1994);
Lindsey v. Comm'r, 98 T.C. 672 (1992); Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162 (D. Mass.
2004).
206 Empresa provides a case in point, as its use of the Last-in-Time rule against a Cu-
ban company has ramifications in connection with the Paris Convention. See Empresa,
399 F.3d at 481 (2005); see also Multilateral Treaty on the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty, 21 U.S.T. 1583 (1970).
207 See Lucien J. Dhooge, Fiddling With Fidel: An Analysis of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 575, 583 (1997) (stating
"United States imposed a comprehensive economic embargo against Cuba on February 3,
1962"); Natalie Maniaci, The Helms-Burton Act: Is the U.S. Shooting Itself in the Foot?, 35
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 897, 888-89 (1998) ("In 1962, President Kennedy signed one of the first
retaliatory sanctions-an embargo against all trade with Cuba.").
208 See Dhooge, supra note 207, at 581 (noting "[rielations between Cuba and the United
States sharply deteriorated after Castro's ascent to power"); Maniaci, supra note 207, at
898 ("Castro's nationalization of all United States property could be considered an impe-
tus which began a series of sanctions").
209 See UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST CUBA: PROCEEDINGS IN THE
UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES 135 (Michael Krinsky & David Golove
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fall.210 Acts of Congress passed after the end of the Cold War,
such as the Libertad Act of 1996, have actually escalated ten-
sions between Castro's government and the United States.211 Re-
cent codifications of the embargo not only sanction Cuba but also
punish third-party nations for trading with Cuba.212 In spite of
this increased severity, the embargo regulations have continued
to be incapable of effecting regime change and arguably do noth-
ing to push Castro out of power. 21 3
The ineffectiveness of the embargo, the suffering of the people
under it,214 and the intrusiveness of Congressional legislation
into the affairs of foreign nations have led to a backlash against
the United States for its policies against Cuba.215 Many at home
and abroad believe that the embargo is outdated law kept alive
eds., Aletheia Press 1993) (noting justification of embargo against Cuba by reference to
Cuba's alliance with "a hostile Soviet Union"); Michael J. Kelly, Time Warp to 1945-
Resurrection of the Reprisal and Anticipatory Self Defense Doctrines in International Law,
J. TRANSNATIONAL L. POL'Y (2003).
210 See Krinsy & Golove, supra note 209 (noting intensification of "United States effort
to isolate Cuba and undermine its economic viability"); Mathew J. Frankel, Major League
Problems: Baseball's Broken System of Cuban Defection, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 383,
390-90 (2005) ("[Dlespite its failure to topple Castro and the end of the Cold War, the em-
bargo is as strong and wide-ranging as ever").
211 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. § 6021.
See Krinsy & Golove, supra note 210 (observing further strengthening of embargo with
Congress' passage of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992).
212 See 22 U.S.C. § 6032(a)(2) (urging the President to apply sanctions against countries
assisting Cuba); Christine L. Quickenden, Note and Comment, Helms-Burton and Cana-
dian-American Relations at the Crossroads: The Need for an Effective, Bilateral Cuban
Policy, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 733, 736-37 (1997) (noting Canada's view that Liber-
tad Act is an "effort to infringe upon Canadian sovereignty and force the adoption of
American foreign and economic policies").
213 See Note, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: Mirando Por Los Ojos De Don Quijote
o Sancho Panza?, 114 HARV. L. REV. 902, 923 n.141 (2001) (arguing that embargo has lit-
tle to no effect on Castro himself); Jason S. Weiss, The Changing Face of Baseball: In an
Age of Globalization, is Baseball Still as American as Apple Pie and Chevrolet?, 8 U.
MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 123 (2000) (noting Castro has been the dictator of Cuba for
over forty years).
214 See Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, supra note 213, at 923 n.141 (2001) (describing
plight of average Cubans under United States embargo); see also Christy M. DeMelfi,
Nothing but the Facts: an In-Depth Analysis of the Effects of Economic Sanctions Against
Cuba, 5 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 137, 160 (2006) ("Others go a step further, and claim the em-
bargo is nothing but harassment of the Cuban people.").
215 See Andrew Mihalik, The Cuban Embargo: A Ship Weathering the Storm of Global-
ization and International Trade, 12 CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L.J. 98, 101 (2003) ("Experts
observe that not only do economic sanctions, such as the embargo not work; such sanc-
tions actually promote a backlash against U.S. interests"), Quickenden, supra note 212
(indicating that this has caused strains on the relationship between Canada and the
United States).
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by a small but powerful group of Cuban exiles in Florida.21 6 As
the only nation in the world who refuses to do business with
Cuba, the United States is utterly alone in its view of its neigh-
bor.217 Rather than dilute the embargo's effectiveness by recog-
nizing the importance of prior multilateral international com-
mitments, the judicial branch of the United States has
strengthened this alienation by applying the Last in Time rule.
The enabling of unsound foreign policy, exemplified in Empresa,
is slowly contributing to the isolation of the United States. With-
out a greater degree of care, the United States may transform
from superpower to pariah.218
D. The Last in Time Rule Sanctions Violations of International
Law Norms
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter Vi-
enna Treaty] is commonly referred to as the "treaty on trea-
ties" 219 and was opened for signature in 1969 and entered into
216 See Jacqueline Bhabha, Lone Travelers: Rights, Criminalization, and the Transna-
tional Migration of Unaccompanied Children, 7 U CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 269, 282-83
n.60 (noting "powerful Cuban Exile Community in Miami" and its ability to draw national
attention to Elian Gonzalez incident); Oliver Houck, Thinking About Tomorrow: Cuba's
'Alternative Model" for Sustainable Development, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 521, 531 n.53 (2003)
(stating that for many Cuban exiles, the lifting of the embargo would "necessarily presup-
pose the death of Castro").
217 See GENERAL ASSEMBLY OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTS END TO UNITED STATES
EMBARGO ON CUBA (Nov. 8, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/doc
/ga10529.doc.htm (stating that a resolution for "States to refrain from promulgating laws
in breach of freedom of trade and navigation" passed by a vote of 183 to 4, with the United
States voting against); Mithre J. Sandrasagra, U.N.: Opposition Grows to U.S. Blockade
of Cuba (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=
/headlines02/1114-06.htm (describing some of the internal pressure to lift the embargo as
well as international censure).
218 See Jack Alan Levy, Note, As Between Prince and King: Reassessing the Law of For-
eign Sovereign Immunity as Applied to Jus Cogens Violators, 86 GEO. L.J. 2703, 2732-33
(1998) (pondering possibility of United States becoming a "pariah of the international le-
gal community"); see also H.R. REP. NO. 103-702, at 12 (1994) ("We are unaware of any
other country which grants its citizens the right to sue a foreign government for acts that
the foreign government committed outside the citizen's home country.").
219 See Daniel L. Hylton, Note, Default Breakdown: The Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties' Inadequate Framework on Reservations, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 419, 421
n.1 (1994) (noting nickname of Vienna Treaty); see also Richard D. Kearney & Robert E.
Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495, 495 (1970) (discussing the Vienna
Convention Law of Treaties).
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force in 1980.220 Created in response to the uncertainty surround-
ing treaties following World War 11,221 the Vienna Treaty has
been successful in getting nations of the world to sign and be
bound by it.222 Although the United States has signed the treaty
it has refused to ratify it.223 In spite of this, the Vienna Treaty is
generally viewed as binding customary international law by
American courts and legal scholars. 224
Article Twenty-Six of the Vienna Treaty requires that parties
to treaties perform obligations under such treaties in good
faith. 225 The treaty does not define "good faith" specifically but
Black's Law Dictionary defines it as honesty, faithfulness to one's
duty, observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
ing, or lack of intent to defraud or seek unconscionable disadvan-
tage.226
220 See Hylton, supra note 219, at 421 n.1 (noting the dates when the VCLT was signed
and entered into force); see also Kearney, supra note 219, at 495 (stating the enactment
dates of the VCLT).
221 See Hylton, supra note 219, at 419 ('"The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties attempted to give some order to the confusion that was treaty law after World
War II."); see also Kearney, supra note 219, at 495 ("Convention on the Law of Treaties
sets forth the code of rules that will govern the indispensable element in the conduct of
foreign affairs.").
222 See Hylton, supra note 219, at 421 n.3 (noting that "72 states had ratified and 46
states had signed" the treaty); see also Kearney, supra note 219, at 495 ("For the foresee-
able future, the treaty will remain the cement that holds the world community together.").
223 See Michelle S. Friedman, Note, The Uneasy U.S. Relationship with Human Rights
Treaties: The Constitutional Treaty System and Nonself-Execution Declarations, 17 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 187, 230 n.269 (2005) (noting United States' failure to ratify Vienna Treaty); see
also Hylton, supra note 219, at 421 n.2 (noting that by 1971 "the United States had rec-
ognized the Convention as the 'authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice"').
224 See Cara S. O'Driscoll, The Execution of Foreign Nationals in Arizona: Violations of
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Restatement, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 323, 328 n.31
(2000) (noting that "the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 'ac-
cepts the Vienna [Treaty] Convention as, in general, constituting a codification of the cus-
tomary international law governing international agreements"'); see also Hylton, supra
note 219, at 421 (noting "the international community accepts most of the Convention as
the authoritative codification of contemporary international treaty law").
225 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizations or Between International Organizations art. 26, Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M.
543 [hereinafter Vienna Treaty] (containing Article Twenty-Six of the Vienna Treaty, sub-
titled "Pacta sunt servanda," provides that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.").
226 Black's Law defines "good faith" as: "A state of mind consisting in (1) honesty in be-
lief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one's duty or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of intent
to defraud or to seek unconscionable advantage." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th Ed.
2004).
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By refusing to conform to a treaty simply because a later act of
Congress conflicts with it, the United States arguably acts in bad
faith by being unfaithful to its duties and obligations. As a sig-
natory of the Paris Convention, the United States had a duty to
enforce and perform the provisions of it.227 By dismissing the
Paris Convention in favor the embargo, the Second Circuit in
Empresa sanctioned and encouraged the United States to dis-
honor its obligations by passing legislation contrary to prior
agreements in violation of international law. 228
The Second Circuit's decision in Empresa and other Last in
Time decisions clearly violate Article Twenty-Seven of the Vi-
enna Treaty. Article Twenty-Seven prohibits a nation from citing
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.229
By rendering the Paris Convention inoperative because it con-
flicts with the subsequent embargo, the Second Circuit invoked
United States federal law to justify its failure to perform obliga-
tions under a multilateral treaty. The Empresa decision unjustly
ignored the Vienna Treaty and customary international law rec-
ognized by the United States. Although the Vienna Treaty did
not exist at the time of the initial Last in Time decisions, that
227 See Alexis Weissberger, Note, Is Fame Alone Sufficient To Create Priority Rights: An
International Perspective On The Viability Of The Famous/Well-Known Marks Doctrine,
24 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 739, 741 (2006) (noting that the United States is a signa-
tory to the Paris Convention); see also Catherine Brown and Christine Manolakas, Trade
in Technology Within the Free Trade Zone: The Impact of the WTO Agreement, NAFTA,
and Tax Treaties on the NAFTA Signatories, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 71, 74 (2000) (stat-
ing that the United States became a signatory of the Paris Convention in 1967).
228 See Empresa, 399 F.3d at 481 (noting that 'legislative acts trump treaty-made in-
ternational law' when those acts are passed subsequent to ratification of the treaty and
clearly contradict treaty obligations."); see also Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982)
(stating that "[an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of na-
tions, if any other possible construction remains.").
229 Article Twenty-Seven of the Vienna Treaty provides, "[a] party may not invoke pro-
visions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is
without prejudice to article 46." Vienna Treaty, supra note 225, at art. XXVII. Article
Forty-Six states:
1. A state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has
been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding compe-
tence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was
manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State con-
ducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good
faith.
Vienna Treaty, supra note 225, at art. XLVI.
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does not justify the willful defiance of current international trea-
ty norms. 230
The United States recognizes the binding nature of the Treaty
and its status as customary international law. Articles Twenty-
Six and Twenty-Seven of the Vienna Treaty are important pieces
of the international treaty law puzzle. A breach of these binding
provisions is a violation of international law. 231 Under the guise
of the Supreme Court's binding precedent, the Second Circuit's
use of the Last in Time rule in Empresa continued the normaliza-
tion of United States international law disobedience.
E. United States Interests are Better Served by Policies Other
Than the Judicial Application of the Last in Time Rule
Arguments can be made in favor of the Last in Time Rule. It
may further United States interests by allowing Congress to re-
spond to problems that were not foreseeable when the multilat-
eral treaty was signed. It arguably preserves national sover-
eignty and allows the United States to continue to act in its own
best interests without regard to prior engagements. Some would
say that this comment exaggerates the harm done to the interna-
tional reputation of the United States. In support of their argu-
ment, they likely would state that America would not lightly dis-
regard its international obligations because it remains bound in
international courts. 232
230 See Vienna Treaty, supra note 225, at 1 (stating that the treaty was "[d]one at Vi-
enna on 23 May 1969" and "enacted into force on 27 January 1980").
231 See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Retaliation or Arbitration -- or Both? The 1978 United
States-France Aviation Dispute, 74 A.J.I.L. 785, 789, 1980 (defining a material breach "as
a repudiation not sanctioned by other provisions of the Vienna Convention, or a violation
of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty."); see
also Vienna Treaty, supra note 225, at art. LI (stating that a "material breach of a treaty,
for the purposes of this article, consists in: (a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned
by the present Convention; or (b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplish-
ment of the object or purpose of the treaty").
232 See Alfred P. Rubin, PERSPECTIVE: Milosevic and Hussein on Trial, 38 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 1013, 1019 n.3 (2005) ("There are many bilateral and multilateral agreements
to which the United States of America is a party, under which questions of interpretation
are referred to the ICJ."); see also John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice Of The United
States Relating To International Law: State Diplomatic And Consular Relations: Seventh
Circuit Allows Suit Seeking Damages For Lack Of Consular Notification, 100 A.J.I.L. 217,
219, (2006) (noting that the Supreme Court gives "respectful consideration to the inter-
pretation of an international treaty rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to
interpret [it]").
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In response, this comment puts forth the argument that in
most situations the best interests of the United States are better
served by the abolition of the Last in Time rule's application
against multilateral treaties. In other situations, United States
interests would not be harmed by the discontinuation of Last in
Time.233 Moreover, the number of recent Last in Time decisions
indicates that the United States may not feel as committed to its
international agreements as it should.
In creating treaties the United States need not rely on the Last
in Time rule to ensure that its interests will continue to be pro-
tected. Although not binding on the United States as discussed
above, the Vienna Treaty provides for reservations that the
United States may use to its advantage. 23 4 Reservations are uni-
lateral statements made at the signing of a treaty that exclude or
modify the effect of certain provisions in their application to the
nation making the reservation. 235 Although reservations are not
permitted in every instance, 236 they are a powerful tool that
233 See Alejandro Guanes-Mersan, A General Comparative Overview Of Trademark
Regulations Between The United States And Paraguay, 16 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 775,
780 (1999) (describing the Last-in-Time rule as a way to determine the prevailing law
when there are two or more conflicting laws); see also Family Separation as a Violation of
International Law, supra note 78, at 275 (stating "when an international law obligation
conflicts with domestic federal law, United States judges are required to interpret the
domestic law in a way that avoids the conflict if possible; if not, the two have equal status
and the last-in-time rule applies.").
234 See Francesco Parisi & Catherine Sevcenko, Treaty Reservations and the Economics
of Article 21(1) of the Vienna Convention, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2003) (describing
the use of reservations in multilateral treaties as a "seeming contradiction: 1) the law of
reservations, enshrined in Articles 19-21 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, favors the reserving state, but 2) the number of reservations attached to interna-
tional treaties since the adoption of the Convention has been relatively low in spite of that
natural advantage."); see also John King Gamble, Jr., Reservations To Multilateral Trea-
ties: A Macroscopic View of State Practice, 74 A.J.I.L. 372, 372 (1980) ('The International
Law Commission, in its deliberations about the law of treaties, put the issue well: '[A]
power to formulate reservations must in the nature of things tend to make it easier for
some States to execute the act necessary to bind themselves finally to participating in the
treaty and therefore tend to promote a greater measure of universality in the application
of the treaty."').
235 Article Two of the Vienna Treaty defines "reservations" as:
a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it pur-
ports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty
in their application to that State
Vienna Treaty, supra note 225, art. II.
236 Article Nineteen of the Vienna Treaty explicitly states that reservations cannot be
formulated in three situations. Vienna Treaty, supra note 225, art. XIX. Article Nineteen
states:
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would allow the United States to agree to a treaty and retain the
ability to unilaterally tailor it to its own particular goals in both
creation and enforcement. Further protecting the interests of in-
dividual nations, the Vienna Treaty does not require that reser-
vations expressly authorized by the treaty be accepted by the
other contracting states.23 7 In the instance of the treaty at issue
in Empresa, the United States could have made a reservation
modifying the enforcement of the treaty under certain specified
conditions. By insisting that the treaty contain the reservation
that the United States would not enforce the treaty in favor of
nations that fell into a series of explicit categories, the United
States could have continued to protect itself against unforeseen
changes. These categories might have included nations that are
openly hostile to the United States or its interests and nations
that have a form of government that is opposed to the United
States system. Post-revolutionary Cuba would have fallen into
either category in this hypothetical reservation and the Last in
Time rule would not have been necessary for the Second Circuit
to resolve Cubatabaco's treaty claims in favor of General Cigar.
In addition to the power of reservations, the Vienna Treaty
also provides other alternatives for the United States when its
interests are no longer served by a treaty. As provided in Article
Forty-Two, the provisions of the treaty itself may allow for the
invalidity, termination or denunciation of a treaty.238 The Last in
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a
treaty, formulate a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include
the reservation in question, may be made; or
(c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is in-
compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
Vienna Treaty, supra note 193, art. XIX.
237 See Vienna Treaty, supra note 225, art. XX ("A reservation expressly authorized by a
treaty does not require any subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States unless
the treaty so provides.").
238 Article Forty-Two, subtitled "Validity and continuance in force of treaties," limits the
circumstances in which a treaty may be terminated or a party may withdraw. Article
Forty-Two states:
1. The validity of a treaty or of the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty
may be impeached only through the application of the present Convention.
2. The termination of a treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal of a party,
may take place only as a result of the application of the provisions of the treaty
or of the present Convention. The same rule applies to suspension of the opera-
tion of a treaty.
Vienna Treaty, supra note 193, art. XLII.
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Time rule provides an incentive for the United States to enter in-
ternational agreements that it should not. Knowing that the
Last in Time rule allows it to ignore politically unpopular or un-
sound international obligations, the United States has less incen-
tive to carefully negotiate agreements or exert sufficient pressure
in the treaty-making process. Instead of making treaties first and
asking questions later, using a more monist approach would force
the United States to take its international obligations more seri-
ously. The abolishment of the Last in Time rule would lead to
the creation of treaties that were better tailored to serve United
States interests and would lessen the loss of reputation that in-
evitably occurs when the United States disregards its commit-
ments.
CONCLUSION
Faced with new challenges on our increasingly inter-connected
planet, our nation is in a precarious position. The United States
currently has the political and military clout to silence the pro-
tests of the rest of the world but this balance of power is not
likely to last forever. By continuing to defer to Congress when
deciding between subsequent federal law and prior multilateral
treaties, the Judicial Branch of our government engenders re-
sentment toward our law and policy. Although the Second Cir-
cuit was bound by Supreme Court precedent in Empresa, the
Last in Time rule's century old story should not end without con-
tinued thoughtful scrutiny by the courts. For the reasons dis-
cussed in this comment, the Supreme Court should correct one
hundred years of mistaken precedent and retire the Last in Time
rule as it applies against multilateral treaties.
2008]

